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I.

INTRODUCTION

This paper comparatively explores the wisdom of America’s enforcement of federal
corporate laws through the disproportionate assignment of criminal penalties at the entitylevel. Although federal criminal statutes have long been enforced against individual
violators, the vigor with which they are applied pales in comparison to the frequency of
entity-level enforcement.1 This state of affairs has been undoubtedly spurred by the elevated
state of mind requirements appended to federal securities statutes, the considerable difficulty
of proving individual criminal intent within a fragmented corporate structure, and the
availability of entity-level liability doctrine to prosecutors. This has resulted in countless
individual violators evading punishment, while shareholders bear the cost of the penalties
incurred by and extracted from the corporation at the organizational level.
II.

STATEMENT OF LAW

To successfully defend entity-level corporate liability “in deterrence terms”—which
is precisely what those highlighting the doctrine’s advantages emphasize—it must be shown
to actually deter corporate managers and employees more effectively than direct individual
liability.2 Entity liability’s staunchest defenders cite the “frequency of corporate misconduct,
the extraordinarily serious consequences of such conduct, and the difficulty of proving many



Litigation Associate, Coleman, Yovanovich & Koester, P.A.; J.D., University of Michigan Law
School.
1 Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1434, 1444 (2007) (observing that from 1992 to 2002—the ten years during which nonprosecution agreements in the corporate criminal context were first allowed—an “average of fewer
than two [of such agreements] a year” were struck, while a “staggering” forty three non-prosecution
agreements—or average of fourteen per year—were entered into from the beginning of 2003 to the
end of 2006).
2 Vikramaditya Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1477, 1494-95 (1996) (emphasis added).
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corporate and white collar offenses” as central justifications for their reluctance to curb use
of the doctrine.3
In so doing, the doctrine’s defenders fail to grasp the degree to which corporate
fraud has intensified, all the while prosecutorial reliance4 on entity-level liability has grown
and the number of individual criminal prosecutions—except for the most egregious of
frauds5—has correspondingly shrunk.6 Thus, rather than fear “restricting”7 a mode of
enforcement whose effectiveness and equity have continually been called into question, we
ought to instead acknowledge the entity-level mode’s raison d’être—i.e., the difficulty of
proving individual intent—and craft comprehensive reforms that directly address and
surmount this inadequacy.
III.

ENTITY-LEVEL CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY – ORIGINS AND
MECHANICS

Federal courts developed and established the preconditions for entity-level criminal
liability more than a century ago.8 Premised on the notion that the mental state of agents is
imputed to the entity and immediately becomes an “ingredient”9 of the corporation, entitylevel attribution merely requires proof of the following three elements: that a corporate agent
(i) was responsible for the criminal violation’s actus reus; (ii) acted within the scope of his
employment; and (iii) intended—through the act and however subordinate to his own selfenrichment motive—to confer a benefit on the corporation.10
Most crucially, although the entity’s criminal liability is derived from the misconduct
of the corporation’s agents, “it is not necessary” under the entity liability doctrine “to
identify the specific agents who committed the offense.”11 Instead, it is “sufficient to
establish that some agent or agents of the enterprise must have committed” the crime, a
doctrinal feature which thereby liberates prosecutors from the cumbersome need of having

Sara Sun Beale, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Unique?, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1503, 1505-06 (2007).
ANDREW WEISSMANN, RICHARD ZIEGLER, LUKE MCLOUGHLIN & JOSEPH MCFADDEN,
REFORMING CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY TO PROMOTE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
(Oct. 2008), available at http:// www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get_ilr_doc.php?id=1218
(underscoring the degree to which entity-level enforcement is the “prevailing legal rule”).
5 Robert Frank & Amir Efrati, ‘Evil’ Madoff Gets 150 Years in Epic Fraud, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2009, at
A1.
6 John S. Baker, Corporations Aren’t Criminals, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2002, at A18.
7 Beale, supra note 3, at 1505-06.
8 See New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909).
9 United States. v. Hayes Int’l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986).
10 Beale, supra note 3, at 1505.
11 Bernd Schünemann, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A German Perspective, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 35,
39 (2005).
3
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to prove, as a precondition for securing an entity’s conviction, that a specific individual agent
actually perpetrated the underlying statutory offense.12
Proponents of entity liability assert that it “deters corporate managers [and]
employees better than . . . direct individual liability.”13 By decreasing the corporation’s net
value through the imposition of exorbitant post-conviction penalties, the doctrine leaves it to
the corporation’s shareholders “who bear the brunt of such a decrease . . . to encourage
managers not to commit undesirable acts.”14 Furthermore, because entity liability makes
securing some penalty for corporate misconduct more likely (irrespective of whether it is
achieved through the enforcement mode most likely to deter recurrence), the doctrine
remedies the difficulties associated with securing an individual agent’s conviction and
circumvents the prospect of a judgment proof corporate agent.15
Despite these professed virtues, the conceptual and practical contradictions inherent
in the entity liability doctrine persist. First, the capacity of shareholders to serve as an
impetus for effective oversight is “tempered” by the collective difficulty shareholders face in
“monitoring the activities of the corporation’s managers and employees.”16 All too often,
such scrutiny is “prohibitively costly,” and managers’ activities are themselves “imperfectly
observable.”17 Additionally, the economic benefit an individual corporate agent stands to
reap from misconduct will almost always outweigh the dispersed costs that any single
shareholder will incur if large fines follow conviction at the entity-level—especially when, as
now, highly diversified portfolios are the norm across investor subsets.18 When these
realities are considered alongside state corporate law’s doctrinal resistance19 to greater
shareholder involvement in corporate supervision and direction, the patent “unfair[ness]” of
penalizing “innocent” shareholders for failing to prevent conduct for which they are
arguably the poorest positioned and least incentivized to detect becomes apparent.20

Id. (emphasis added).
Khanna, supra note 2, at 1494-95.
14 Id. at 1495.
15 Id. at 1495-96.
16 Id. at 1495.
17 Id.
18 Robert C. Pozen, Betsy Palmer & Natalie Shapiro, Asset Allocation by Institutional Investors After the
Recent Financial Crisis (December 2010), available at http://pa-paers.org/documents/spring2011MFSpaperforlibrary.pdf.
19 D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 279 (1998) (observing that
express legal barriers have contributed to making the shareholder primacy norm “nearly irrelevant to
the ordinary business decisions of modern corporations”).
20 WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY MINDS: THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY 7 (2002); see also Elizabeth A. Plimpton & Danielle Walsh, Corporate Criminal
Liability, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 331, 332 (2010) (noting that punishing the corporation “in effect
punishes innocent shareholders”).
12
13
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Beyond the burdens it places on a corporation’s shareholders, entity liability’s
devastating effect on the most blameless and detached corporate stakeholders cannot be
overlooked. With conviction amounting to a veritable “death sentence” to business firms
that practice in federally regulated industries requiring active certification statuses, entitylevel liability more often than not strips a convicted firm of its eligibility to conduct business
and thereby results in its being required to “let go of tens of thousands of employees,”
despite the fact that nearly all of them had absolutely “no connection to the wrongdoing.”21
At an even more basic level, entity liability also “[runs] contrary to an aim of
criminal law—punishment of the morally [culpable]—because it relie[s] upon vicarious guilt
rather than personal fault.”22 Indeed, if imparting reputational stigma to a criminal offender
is one of the law’s central objectives, then entity liability cannot—given the untenability23 of
assigning blame to juristic constructs such as corporations—communicate society’s distaste
for the misconduct nearly as effectively as an individual person’s conviction, which
undercuts the wisdom of using organizational punishment.24 Furthermore, the presence of
an altogether distinct entity-level liability route exacerbates the “massive uncertainty” already
prevalent within the fiduciary duty universe without actually producing meaningful gains at
the level of deterrence.25 Finally, the doctrine’s judge-made derivation undermines its
legitimacy even among those who most aggressively advocate for corporate criminal law’s
reorientation away from individual liability.26
In light of these shortcomings, it is unsurprising that entity liability is historically
disfavored as a mode for punishing corporate crime abroad, with most advanced economies
“h[o]ld[ing] fast in refusing to punish criminally corporations for the acts of their individual
directors or employees.”27 Europe’s recent gestures towards greater incorporation of entitylevel liability are better explained by the European Union’s desire to achieve pan-Continental

Robert J. Sussman & Gregory S. Saikin, Corporate Crimes: The Penalties and the Pendulum, 43 THE
ADVOC. (TEXAS) 39, 39 (2008).
22 Khanna, supra note 2, at 1484-85.
23 Ved P. Nanda, Corporate Criminal Liability in the United States: Is a New Approach Warranted?, 58 AM. J.
COMP. L. 605, 607, 628 (2010) (concluding that “because corporations cannot act on their own or
form criminal intent” penalizing corporations “makes no sense and serves no useful function”).
24 SALLY SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 20 (2002) (noting that nonincarceratory penalties, such as entity criminal liability, are per se “nonstigmatic and conciliatory”); Cf.
Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 833, 835-36
(2000).
25 Wall Street and Fiduciary Duties: Can Jail Time Serve as an Adequate Deterrent for Willful Violations: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2010), (statement of
Larry E. Ribstein).
26 Weissmann, Ziegler, McLoughlin & McFadden, supra note 4, at 2 (attributing much of the entitylevel doctrine’s illegitimacy to the fact that it has never been “commanded by Congress”).
27 Edward B. Diskant, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine
Through Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 YALE L.J. 126, 129 (2008).
21
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integration within a U.S.led global financial system than by Europe’s faith in entity-level
liability’s superior capacity to deter corporate criminality.28
IV.

INDIVIDUAL CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Unlike entity liability, which attempts to deter indirectly, “direct liability . . . directly
influences.”29 Beyond the qualitative advantages of deterrence regimes that directly seek to
dissuade certain conduct, the individual deterrence model remains preferable, if for no other
reason than because entity liability’s very emergence was propelled by American corporate
law’s self-imposed “difficulty” identifying an individual offender within a “complex and
decentralized structure,”30 as opposed to emerging in response to any fundamental
deficiencies within the individual liability model.31
Furthermore, individually imposed corporate criminal penalties are better justified in
light of the substantial financial benefits and economic liability limitations that individual
corporate agents enjoy as a result of the corporation’s status.32 Decentralized corporate
form does profitably enable the entity’s “more prompt[ ] [reaction] to market . . . fluctuations
and technological change,”33 rendering criminal statutes incapable of “adjust[ing] to and
permeat[ing] dynamic business organizations.”34 Indeed, it is “because” of the decentralized
corporate form that the fairness of allowing individual corporate agents to doubly benefit
from the corporate structure’s conferral of windfalls and safe harbors, without concurrently
bearing greater individual penalties for deviance, is called into question.35
Critics proffer two primary theoretical objections to reliance on elevated individual
corporate criminal penalties. First, that the prosecution of corporate agents will undercompensate victims and under-deter culprits in light of the individual offender’s judgment
proof propensity.36 Second, that corporate agents will simply demand a higher risk-premium
as a condition for accepting employment.37 Neither, however, represents a compelling case
against the individual enforcement model.38 Rather, the first criticism completely overlooks
the fact that individual criminal prosecution can just as readily result in incarceration as it can

See Henry J. Jacek, The Influence of Organized American Business on Public Policy in the European Union: The
Transition from Outsider to Insider (1996), http://aei.pitt.edu/6948/1/jacek_henry_j.pdf.
29 Khanna, supra note 2, at 1495.
30 Cristina de Maglie, Models of Corporate Criminal Liability in Comparative Law, 4 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD.
L. REV. 547, 557 (2005).
31 Id. at 551-52.
32 See generally id.
33 Id. at 560.
34 Simpson, supra note 24, at 5.
35 See generally id.
36 Khanna, supra note 2, at 1496.
37 Id.
38 See generally id.
28
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result in monetary fines.39 Likewise, the latter critique merely describes a consequence of
increased resort to individual punishment without explaining why a world in which
corporate employees demand much higher risk-premiums up front—which might in turn
help sharpen and more accurately reflect the societal costs that corporate fraud actually
imposes—would necessarily be undesirable.40
V.

INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR SECURITIES FRAUD IN THE U.S. –
GENERALLY

The Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”) regulates the offering of securities to public
investors and prohibits individuals from “willfully” making any false or misleading
statements in a registration statement.41 Violations of the 1933 Act trigger a fine of up to
$10,000 and imprisonment for up to five years.42 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
which increased the existing fine ceiling, preserved the 1933 Act’s willful43 intent standard.44
During the interim between the Great Depression and the financial crisis in 2008
(“2008 Financial Crisis”), little corporate criminal statutory reform occurred. Unsurprisingly,
the growing complexity of financial transactions and corporate configurations made
establishing an individual’s intent to defraud progressively more difficult under the scienter
standards enshrined in antiquated legislation.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”), enacted with overwhelming
bi-partisan support to address numerous accounting frauds, criminalized the “knowing”
execution of a fraudulent scheme in connection with a public company’s securities and
exposed violators to imprisonment for up to 25 years.45 However, like its predecessors,
Sarbanes-Oxley required that prosecutors prove the defendant’s knowledge of the conduct’s
unlawfulness in addition to demonstrating the defendant’s awareness of the conduct’s
wrongfulness.46
Given the burden of showing that an agent’s conduct stemmed from “‘knowing[ ],’
as opposed to negligent[ ] or even reckless[ ]” behavior, it was apparent that prosecutors

Thus creating a qualitatively distinct form of deterrence and constituting a penalty from which no
defendant can hide by claiming personal insolvency.
40 See generally Khanna, supra note 2.
41 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77).
42 15 U.S.C. § 77x.
43 While proving willfulness does not require demonstrating that the defendant knew of the conduct’s
unlawfulness at the time of commission, it demands a functionally analogous showing that the
defendant knew it was wrongful.
44 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 904 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
78).
45 See 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2006).
46 Id.
39
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would encounter “difficulty in enforcing” Sarbanes-Oxley.47 Furthermore, although
Sarbanes-Oxley’s criminal provisions “sound[ed] significant” and “appear[ed]” to create
“new or broader federal crimes,” much of the conduct proscribed had been “at least
theoretically” prohibited before the legislation’s passage.48
Illustrative of the degree to which federal statutes, even post-Sarbanes-Oxley, persist
in erecting near insurmountable proof of intent barriers is the government’s own
acknowledgement that for a defendant to violate applicable securities fraud provisions, “[h]e
must not only know that the periodic report contains materially false information, he must
falsely certify…that the report is materially accurate, he must do so knowing that such a false
certification is forbidden by law, and he must do so with the specific intent to violate the law.”49
Beyond the hard-to-satisfy proof standards contained within these criminal statutes,
enforcement hurdles are heightened within the securities fraud context where cases (i)
frequently involve the most complex factual predicates; (ii) require jurors to master and
apply extremely nuanced understandings of guilt; and (iii) are likely to pit prosecutors against
particularly skilled defense counsel.50
Further complicating this is the fact that the substantive legal impediments to the
assignment of individual culpability in cases of corporate fraud have helped nourish a belief
among corporate agents that “[o]ver time, and with an increasing number of successes to
[their] credit,” they can become “impervious to risk.”51 The entrenchment of this
“psychology” has in turn “encourage[d] . . . ever-increasingly dangerous risk-taking,” a reality
no doubt exacerbated by the “distance” that separates the corporate decision-maker from
the “flesh-and-blood persons” left disproportionately vulnerable to, and impacted by, the
decision’s consequences.52
At an even deeper level, this psychology has—in a manner that further complicates
the individual enforcement of U.S. corporate criminal laws—actually tended to obscure the
misconduct of corporate agents who, unlike more boastful criminals, “will normally take
pains to avoid the stigma of criminality,” opt to pressure their subordinates while
simultaneously “disassociat[ing] themselves from any offence that might be committed,”
and, despite “expressing allegiance” to such policies, refrain from implementing superficially
stringent but deficient internal compliance policies that enable them to disclaim
Larry Bumgardner, Reforming Corporate America: How Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Impact American
Business?, 6 GRAZIADIO BUS. REV. (2003), http://gbr.pepperdine.edu/2010/08/reforming-corporateamerica/.
48 Id. at 3-4.
49 U.S. v. Scrushy, No. CR-03-BE-0530-S, 2004 WL 2713262, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 2004)
(emphasis added).
50 See generally KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS
AT WORK (1985); Diskant, supra note 27, at 131, 151.
51 JAMES GOBERT & MAURICE PUNCH, RETHINKING CORPORATE CRIME 20 (2003).
52 Id. at 20-21.
47
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“responsibility for . . . illegal activities.”53 In fact, empirical evidence drawn from studies of
the financial services industry suggests that, perhaps more than any other corporate sphere,
“segmentation of moral views by rank, status, or hierarchy within the organization”—i.e., the
very preconditions needed for the phenomena referenced above to take root—is the order
of the day.54 Consequently, over time a widespread belief has emerged that there is “only a
remote chance” that corporate misconduct will be individually prosecuted and result in
conviction.55
VI.

INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR SECURITIES FRAUD IN THE U.S. –
2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS

At the time of Sarbanes-Oxley’s passage, critics warned that the deterrence effect of
the new penalties would prove to be “minimal” if the “corporate officers considered to be
the prime culprits in the scandals . . . serve little or no prison time.”56 The infrequency with
which the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s criminal provisions have
been enforced against individuals since the 2008 Financial Crisis confirms the extent to
which such prescience went—and continues to go—unheeded.57
Relative to the national scale of the misrepresentation, the paucity of individual
criminal prosecutions in the 2008 Financial Crisis’ wake has been glaring: “there has not
been a single criminal prosecution of . . . any individual senior financial executive—literally
zero.”58 Moreover, while reasonable people can debate the extent to which securities fraud
caused the crisis, “the answer clearly is not zero.”59 Similarly perplexed, an outraged public
has pressed investigators on the lack of prosecutions of top Wall Street executives in the
wake of the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression.60
However, the SEC’s inability to prosecute suspected violators has not resulted from
want of effort.61 Rather, the SEC’s Division of Enforcement has “struggled to build cases
proving fraudulent behavior or other criminal misconduct” against even those persons
whose conduct rested at the heart of the financial crisis.62 Most notably, the SEC dropped
Id. at 22; see also Laufer, supra note 20, at 126.
Laufer, supra note 20, at 126; see PETER CLEARY YEAGER, MANAGEMENT, MORALITY, AND LAW:
ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS AND ETHICAL DELIBERATIONS IN CORPORATE CRIME 147 (1995).
55 Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385,
1391 (2006).
56 Bumgardner, supra note 47.
57 Id.
58 Charles Ferguson, Barack Obama: The Oligarch’s President, SALON.COM (Oct. 27, 2010 8:30 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2010/10/27/barack_obama_wall_street/.
59 Id.
60 Joe Rauch, Senators Question the Lack of Wall Street Prosecutions, REUTERS, Sept. 22, 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/22/us-banks-enforcement-idUSTRE68L4WG20100922.
61 Id.
62 Id.
53
54
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criminal charges against former AIG executive Joseph Cassano and resorted to civil
settlement with former Countrywide chief Angelo Mozilo—each of whose actions were
disproportionately responsible for wreaking economic havoc, and for which the latter earned
the moniker “godfather of subprime mortgages.”63
Moreover, if, as many have insisted, federal prosecutorial unwillingness to pursue
criminal enforcement actions against individual corporate agents was primarily motivated by
a desire to avoid crushing the financial services industry, shortly after dedicating nearly a
trillion tax-payer dollars to its resuscitation, then parallel concerns would be expected to
have prevented the federal government from mounting criminal enforcement actions at the
entity-level.64 Instead, organizational investigations, both during and since the 2008
Financial Crisis, have proceeded uninterrupted, leaving only the nature of U.S. corporate
criminal laws and the availability of entity-level enforcement to explain many of the observed
trends.65
Accepting the argument advanced herein—that applicable individual corporate
criminal laws currently impose, what are in most instances, near insurmountable proof-ofintent obstacles—might have led to the expectation that the recent flurry of financial reform
legislation, which culminated in the Dodd-Frank Act’s passage, would rectify this deficiency
head-on. Instead, through the Dodd-Frank Act,66 Congress passed legislation focused
almost entirely on financial regulation and which, “unlike many systemic reform statutes . . .
does not do much with the criminal law.”67 Astonishingly, only two of the Dodd-Frank
Act’s provisions even allude to the corporate criminal law. One of Dodd-Frank’s provisions
“tries to nudge” the U.S. Sentencing Commission towards increasing recommended
sentences for individuals convicted of securities and mortgage fraud by “ask[ing]” the
Commission to ensure that the federal sentencing guidelines reflect Congress’ intent that
penalties appropriately account for both the actual and potential harm posed by these
offenses.68 In so doing, Congress declined69 to provide leadership on an issue where the
need for additional guidance was greatest, and instead prodded an independent agency—
Frank Rich, Op-Ed., What Happened to Change We Can Believe In, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at
WK10, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/opinion/24rich.html?_r=0.
64 See Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Wall St. Polices Itself, Prosecutors Use Softer Approach, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 8, 2011, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/business/in-shift-federalprosecutors-are-lenient-as-companies-break-the-law.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
65 Id.
66 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010).
67 Peter J. Henning, A New World Begins for Wall Street Oversight, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, (July 19,
2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/a-new-world-begins-for-wall-street-oversight/.
68 Id.
69 Laufer, supra note 20, at 119 (describing prior instances where Congress had essentially asked the
U.S. Sentencing Commission to “cover for [its] failures of substantive law reform with guidelines . . .
that are no substitute”).
63
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whose very authority to promulgate criminal penalties had recently been undercut70—to
substitute its recommendations for Congress’ considered judgment.71
With no less timidity, a second Dodd-Frank provision lengthened the statute of
limitations applicable to securities and mortgage fraud from five to six years, giving
prosecutors “a little more breathing room” to investigate these complex crimes.72 Thus,
rather than acting to remove the substantive and procedural obstacles which have
continually impeded corporate criminal prosecutions, Congress opted to give prosecutors
some more time to maneuver a maze that Congress had made un-navigable. For these
reasons, the Dodd-Frank Act cannot be mistaken for a serious attempt at meaningful reform
of U.S. corporate criminal law.
VII.

INDIVIDUAL CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN EUROPE

A stark contrast exists between Europe’s record of enforcing corporate criminal
laws against individuals and the “literally zero” U.S. prosecutions of those who “profited
from a bubble they deliberately helped inflate and walked away with their wealth [and liberty]
largely intact.”73 For example, the financial crisis transgressions of Jerome Kerviel—a “fairly
junior” French trader at Societe Generale, yielded a three-year prison sentence and an order
to pay $6.7 billion dollars in restitution.74 Tellingly, the comparison suggests that Kerviel
was “unlucky” not to have perpetrated his misconduct in the United States where it is
“unlikely” he would have been punished severely.75 Closer inspection sheds further light on
the defining characteristics of corporate criminal law’s enforcement in Europe where,
“[a]cross countries,” there is a shared recognition that individual criminal liability can help
motivate compliance through “fear”76 of adverse consequences, and criminal penalties are
imposed for “various contraventions of corporate legislation and for infringements of a
range of other statutes.”77
Unlike their counterparts in the U.S. Congress, legislators throughout Europe have
actively spent the past two decades bolstering and modifying their respective corporate

U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 268 (2005) (holding that sentencing guidelines carry no more than
advisory force).
71 Id.
72 Henning, supra note 67.
73 Greg Keller, Rogue French Trader, Sentenced to Jail, Hit With $6.7 Billion Fine, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct.
5,
2010,
7:53
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/05/jerome-kerviel-roguefren_n_750464.html.
74 Id.
75 Tracy Corrigan, Does Kerviel Deserve to do Time for SocGen Rogue Trading?, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Oct. 5,
2010),
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/tracycorrigan/100007993/what-does-kerviels-jailsentence-tell-us-about-financial-crime/.
76 Cheffins and Black, supra note 55, at 1387.
77 Id. at 1470.
70
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criminal law regimes.78 In the process, Europe has adopted a more individual-centric
deterrent approach reflective of “the traditional concept of crime being . . . individual
conduct dominated” and more closely bound to the “concept of personal culpability.”79
The individual crime of omission, violated whenever non-disclosure is material and
irrespective of the presence of a specific intent to deceive, has in recent years emerged as the
“most important instrument of criminal justice” deployed against corporate crime on the
European Continent.80 Europe’s success in deterring corporate crime through its reliance on
individual enforcement became all the more apparent after several nations experimented
with entity-level enforcement of antitrust laws.81 Although corporate convictions during this
phase resulted in several hundred million dollars in fines being meted out, enforcement
“never led to the sacking of [any of] the responsible members of the board,” let alone to any
corporate agent’s criminal prosecution, realities which convinced many Europeans that
reliance on entity-level enforcement “leads to a weakening of the deterrent effect on an
individual level.”82
Perhaps nowhere are the disparities between American and European attitudes
toward corporate criminal law more pronounced than in Germany, where individual liability
is “based more on penal principles than civil [principles].”83 Spurred by a societal belief that
a penal approach serves as a “better deterrent,” there is “very little—quite possibly zero—
real personal civil liability”84 for German corporate fraud.85 Moreover, since Germans tend
to view the punishment of individual corporate wrongdoers “as a more satisfying response
to white-collar crime than entity liability,”86 Germany infrequently employs entity-level
liability to enforce its corporate criminal laws.
Equally noteworthy, however, is the fact that Germany’s rules governing individual
criminal liability “are more adaptable to the corporate context.”87 Specifically, the German
judicial system has adopted a “wider conception of mens rea” that is “more suitable” to the
Id. at 1470-75 (observing that England has created “some 250 offenses,” Germany “undertake[s] a
lot of [crime legislation in] the field of Company Law, Australia has enacted “numerous offenses for
which corporate officials may be held criminally liable,” and that France has passed “a substantial
number of provisions in [corporate] [ ] legislation where breach can create criminal liability and
pursuant to which the “number of prosecutions of those managing French companies has grown considerably
over the past two decades) (emphasis added).
79 Schünemann, supra note 11, at 35.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 41.
82 Id. (emphasis added).
83 Patrick Ryan, Understanding Director & Officer Liability in Germany for Dissemination of False Information:
Perspectives From an Outsider, 4 Ger. L.J. 439, 440 (2003).
84 Id. at 439.
85 Id.
86 Diskant, supra note 27, at 146.
87 de Maglie, supra note 30, at 561.
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emerging and evolving economic order within which Germany’s corporate personnel
operate.88
Indeed, by criminalizing areas “preliminary” to the actual harm, and
supplementing corporate crimes such as fraud with a “‘ring’ of offenses,” Germany has
transformed violations previously requiring a showing of “concrete harm” into offenses now
triggered by the “abstract endangerment” of some right.89
Consistent with its more individual-centric penal philosophy, Germany also
punishes corporate officers “harshly,” especially within the context of a legal regime “often
considered lenient in comparison to the American system.”90 Germany has even begun
resorting to corporate criminal law “for the enforcement of administrative duties.”91
In addition to making individual conviction substantively easier, Germany has also
defined offenses like “invest[or] fraud” and “business situation fraudulent
misrepresentation” with great precision, thus running counter to U.S. statutes which impart a
“level of uncertainty [that] is by far higher.”92 Consequently, German law has been able to
provide greater ex ante guidance to corporate agents and to impose greater constraints on
prosecutorial overreach ex post. It is therefore unsurprising that Germany’s white-collar
criminal law reforms have been criticized as “overextended” and too “far reaching”93—a
charge diametrically opposed to the one most commonly leveled against U.S. corporate
criminal law reforms and undoubtedly inspired by the relative effectiveness94 of Germany’s
approach in achieving deterrence.95
VIII.

MIXED ENTITY-LEVEL & INDIVIDUAL CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
SYSTEMS

The deterrent success Germany witnessed after “rapidly” expanding the
reach of its white-collar criminal laws and “increas[ing]” maximum penalties has been aided
by Germany’s simultaneous “reduc[tion] [of] certain evidentiary burdens need[ed] for
conviction.”96 In many respects, the fact that “complicated tactical procedures”—which rest
Id.
Schünemann, supra note 11, at 45-47.
90 Diskant, supra note 27, at 142.
91 Schünemann, supra note 11, at 45.
92 Id. at 45-46.
93 Diskant, supra note 27, at 143.
94 Matthew Allen, KPMG Fraud Barometer 2008, SWISSINFO.CH, (Feb. 3, 2009, 9:09 AM),
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/Whitecollar_crime_flourishes_as_economy_dips.html?cid=7192084 (placing Germany [500 million euros]
last in a list of major European economies with the largest corporate fraud related losses, behind
Spain [2.8 billion euros], England [1.4 billion euros], and Switzerland [800 million euros]).
95 Ryan, supra note 82, at 440 (noting that while individual corporate criminal prosecutions have
become less common over time, resort to criminal action in each instance of violation has become
“more likely”).
96 Diskant, supra note 27, at 143.
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at the heart of U.S. federal prosecutorial power vis-à-vis the corporate entity—“are impossible
in Germany”97 merely underscores the degree to which European98 laws facilitate individual
criminal enforcement.99 On the other hand, U.S. corporate criminal laws, notwithstanding
their substantive deficiencies, are saddled with procedural requirements that make entitylevel enforcement’s predominance inevitable and susceptible to abuse.100
It is the very existence of a bifurcated enforcement system in the United States
which, in attempting to compensate for the inadequacies of American corporate criminal
statutes, exacerbates the inequities associated with entity-level enforcement.101 Given the
substance of America’s corporate criminal statutes and the robust constitutional protections
the United States affords criminal defendants, the availability of an altogether alternate route
to conviction—here, at the entity-level—tempts prosecutors to leverage the weighty threat
of organizational criminal liability in order to circumvent nettlesome individual rights.102
As a consequence of the fact that U.S. criminal defendants “enjoy significant
procedural protections that are . . . unavailable”103 in most foreign nations, U.S. corporate
criminal law—through its provision of entity-level recourse and conferral of immense
prosecutorial discretion—virtually guarantees that American procedure’s “unique aspects”
will be “manipulated”104 by a government able to threaten corporations with the prospect of
a “potentially lethal” entity-level prosecution in order to induce their cooperation in the
inherently and exceedingly difficult prosecution of individual corporate employees.105
For this reason, the proliferation of non-prosecution agreements between the U.S.
government and American corporations and the steady increase in government demands
that—as a condition for avoiding prosecution—corporations waive their attorney-client
privilege, produce all requested documents, and terminate indemnification agreements with
individual corporate agents (so as to impair the defense-mounting ability of those agents) are
Ryan, supra note 82, at 446.
William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The Difficulties of Building an
Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (1992) (describing how the
Italian system achieves “efficiency by avoiding a full adversarial trial” and is unconstrained by “many
of the most time-consuming features of the U.S. trial system”).
99 See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857,
859 (1984) (discussing the prevalence of entity level enforcement).
100 Id.
101 Id. (“In practice, however, much of this dual structure collapses.”).
102 Id. at 862.
103 Diskant, supra note 27, at 131, 152 (noting that, in addition to the fact that foreign jurisdictions
afford fewer individual criminal procedural protections, the plea bargaining process is also “very
limited” abroad and that in many jurisdictions prosecutors are “required to bring charges if the facts
support doing so”).
104 Id. at 132, 161.
105 Diskant, supra note 27, at 128-29; see Andrew Weissman & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal
Corporate Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 414 (2007); see also George Ellard, Making the Silent Speak and the
Informed Wary, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 985, 987 (2005).
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far less “reflection[s] of principled criminal theory” than they are prosecutorial “tool[s].”106
The U.S. Department of Justice’s “increased use” of such constitutionally problematic
leveraging tactics and resort to ever vacillating entity-level prosecution policy memoranda
which—despite the fact that federal law already “generously” provides for entity-level
corporate liability—are often overzealously “depart[ed]” from has led the private criminal
bar to go so far as to question whether this state of affairs “undermin[es] the adversary
system” at its very core.107
In many instances, such prosecutorial posturing “rather artificially”108 generates
sharp conflicts between the interests of individual corporate defendants and those of their
still-unindicted former colleagues, who have strong incentive to hasten investigative closure
by complying with the government’s sweeping demands.109 This incentive remains if for no
other reason than to draw attention away from their own conduct, even if doing so damages
the procedural protections on which their now-indicted former colleagues had come to
rely.110
Not surprisingly, this system produces grave doubts in light of the fact that—
notwithstanding the existence of codified prosecutorial guidelines—“many” entity-level
prosecutions still proceed on the basis of idiosyncratic calculations driven by a host of nonlegal considerations.111 Given such doubts about the “fairness of trading corporate
cooperation for government-granted favors”112 when a cooperation implicates subordinate
employees, , the wisdom of preserving America’s dual corporate criminal enforcement
regime, which at its best is ineffectual and at its worst actually undermines valued
constitutional guarantees, must be questioned.113
Therefore, entity-level enforcement’s misuse ought to be understood as a direct
result of the paradox Congress has created for the Executive Branch. Because Congress has
been unwilling to directly enact significant statutory reform that realistically enables
individual prosecution, the Department of Justice is left to indirectly accomplish reform
through the organizational liability route.114 In so doing, Congress has left the Executive’s

Diskant, supra note 27, at 169.
Sussman & Saikin, supra note 21, at 40, 42.
108 Diskant, supra note 27¸ at 141.
109 Plimpton & Walsh, supra note 20, at 344 (describing the mechanics of “cooperation credit” and
detailing the extent to which it hinges on the entity’s swift and unquestioning acceptance of the
government’s settlement terms).
110 Id.
111 Laufer, supra note 20, at 40 (contending that this process reveals the “selective vigilance of federal
law enforcement”).
112 William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors, 87 IOWA L. REV. 643,
647 (2002).
113 Plimpton & Walsh, supra note 20, at 344.
114 Rauch, supra note 60.
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hands bound precisely when public demand for a definitive reduction in corporate fraud has
become greatest.115
Maximal deterrence of securities fraud will remain elusive until, both doctrinally and
with respect to modes of enforcement, U.S. corporate criminal law is reoriented away from
the entity and toward the individual. Now more than ever, it is essential for Congress to
step up and repair the framework it has habitually neglected.
IX.

SUGGESTED POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS

After surveying the existing legal landscape and exploring the benefits and pitfalls
associated with entity-level and individual corporate criminal liability, it is apparent that a
central part of any truly effective U.S. corporate criminal law reform will necessarily entail
making criminal negligence the statutory scienter standard which governs the securities sphere.
Unlike knowledge or willfulness, criminal negligence “does not involve an inquiry into the
state of mind of the accused.”116 As a result, liability flows from the fact that the accused has
“failed to adhere to the standard of conduct expected of a reasonable person under similar
circumstances,” making culpability contingent on the breach of “an objective or external
standard.”117 Conviction is therefore grounded in a belief that the accused should have known
that their actions carried a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm.118 While effective
statutory reform could arguably be achieved through a downward redefinition of the
materiality of a fact whose omission triggers a criminal violation or through a reduction in
the degree of involvement needed to constitute entry into a corporate conspiracy, emphasis
on scienter reduction helps focus the inquiry by proposing an alternate path which has
already been tried and tested throughout Europe as well as within certain U.S. corporate
sectors.119
Construing the corporate criminal statutes in existence, the United State Supreme
Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder concluded that “merely negligent conduct does not give
rise to liability for securities fraud.”120 Since that time, “surprisingly technical and
complicated” scienter requirements have saddled securities fraud prosecutions.121

Id.
Dan W. Morkel, On the Distinction Between Recklessness and Conscious Negligence, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 325,
326 (1982) (footnote omitted).
117 Id.
118 Gerald H. Gordon, Subjective and Objective Mens Rea, 17 CRIM. L.Q. 355, 357-58 (1975).
119 William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 648, 699-706 (1994) (discussing
the application of criminal negligence to corporate law).
120Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976). See also Michael B. Dunn, Pleading Scienter
After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, A Textualist Revenge, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 193, 204
(1998).
121 Dunn, supra note 122, at 203.
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Nonetheless, given the “extreme[ ] difficult[y]”122 in establishing the requisite
criminal intent in these cases and the societal harm that such misconduct has caused,
concerns regarding the need to balance rigorous statutory modifications “against the need
not to unnecessarily burden normal business activities” have never been more misplaced.123
Reducing the criminal proof-of-intent standard in order to better deter individuals from
engaging in securities fraud will, in light of the securities domain’s susceptibility to fraud’s
recurrence, only serve to strengthen the “disclosure process that has made our markets a
model for other nations,” and help protect investors by “exposing fraudulent schemes that
might withstand scrutiny under” the “defense-oriented” legal rules presently in place.124
Moreover, and so as to avoid over-inclusively sweeping insignificant financial
transactions into the modified statutory fold, legislative revisions ought to confine the
criminal negligence standard’s application to those transactions whose magnitude and
complexity risks systemic destabilization.125 For all other transactions, adopting a criminal
recklessness standard—itself more forceful and logistically feasible to enforce than the
prevailing ‘knowing’ and ‘willful’ requirement—should prove sufficient to achieve effective
individual deterrence.126
In many respects, the call to apply a criminal negligence scienter standard to the
securities industry arises from recognition that the devastating effects of securities fraud are
no longer localized.127 Rather, in an era of immense financial institution interdependence,
and within which the defrauded investor is far more likely to be a large institutional investor
or even a sovereign country,128 the growing improbability of effective harm containment has
made continued reliance on the status quo dangerously unreasonable.129

Id. at 247.
William H. Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness Under the Federal Securities Laws, 34 HOUS.
L. REV. 121, 176 (1997).
124 Matthew Roskoski, Note, A Case-by-Case Approach to Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2265, 2284 (1999).
125 See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co. and Fabrice Tourre, 790 F.Supp.2d 147
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 1:10 Civ. 03229), available at www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comppr2010-59.pdf (highlighting Goldman Sachs’ failure to disclose the role that a third-party with adverse
economic interests played in a portfolio selection transaction which resulted in a $4 billion loss to its
client).
126 See generally Ann Morales Olazábal, Defining Recklessness: A Doctrinal approach To Deterrence of Secondary
Market Securities Fraud, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1415, 1459 (2010) (discussing the merits of applying a
recklessness standard in securities cases).
127 See Genevieve Beyea, Transnational Securities Fraud and the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Securities
Laws: Challenges and Opportunities, 1 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 139, 139 (2011) (“With globalization,
securities markets have become progressively more interconnected, and securities fraud has
increasingly crossed borders, creating problems for national regulators seeking to deter and punish
fraud.”).
128 See, e.g., Georg Brynjarsson, Origins of the Current Economic Downturn in Iceland, ICENEWS (Jan. 9,
2009), http://www.icenews.is/index.php/2009/01/09/origins-of-the-current-economic-downturn122
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Powerful justification for adopting the proposed statutory reforms is the clear
precedent for such reform in American corporate criminal law.130 Indeed, as reflected in the
many instances where individual agents have been found criminally liable for their negligent
failure to affirmatively act or make necessary corporate disclosures, the assignment of
criminal penalties as a result of negligent conduct is conceptually well-established.131
Although derived from instances of corporate misconduct that more viscerally
endangered the public health,132 the “conventional requirement” of demonstrating some
deliberate individual wrongdoing has since been subordinated within certain realms of
corporate activity.133 In those realms, criminal liability has instead been assigned based on a
“defendant’s position in the corporation,” theoretical capacity to have either prevented or
promptly corrected the misconduct, and negligent failure for having failed to undertake
remedial measures.134
This Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine effectively introduces an additional
layer of deterrence by assigning criminal liability to the corporate agent whose “‘reasonable
relation’ to the situation is enough to establish his criminal liability,” even in the absence “of
criminal intent or . . . knowledge of the specific wrongdoing.”135 Although courts typically
invoke the doctrine for strict liability public welfare offenses, some federal courts have
in-iceland; Gudjon Helgason & Paisley Dodds, Geir Haarde, Iceland Ex-PM, Indicted for Role in Financial
Crisis,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Sept.
28,
2010,
7:35
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/28/geir-haarde-indicted-iceland-financialcrisis_n_742800,html (describing how Iceland’s banking sector had been lured into heavy investment
in U.S. subprime mortgage securities and the Icelandic legislature’s decision to criminally indict the
former prime minister who presided over and authorized such profound levels of risk exposure);
Sebastian Dellepiane & Niamh Hardiman, Governing the Irish Economy: From Boom to Bust 8 (
June 17-19, 2010) (unpublished working paper), available at regulation.upf.edu/Dublin-10papers/2A2.prf (observing that, despite being “relatively untouched by US sub-prime lending,” the
international crisis nevertheless managed to “exacerbate[ ]” Ireland’s underlying banking crisis).
129 See DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 2 (2009) (“We
must act now to restore confidence in the integrity of our financial system. The lasting economic
damage to ordinary families and businesses is a constant reminder of the urgent need to act to reform
our financial regulatory system and put our economy on track to a sustainable recovery.”).
130 See 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 49 (15th ed.) (discussing the maturation
of the corporate criminal common law).
131 Martin Petrin, Circumscribing the “Prosecutor’s Ticket to Tag the Elite”–A Critique of the Responsible
Corporate Officer Doctrine, 84 TEMPLE L. REV. 283, 288-89 n.29 (2012).
132 See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 670-73 (1975) (describing the individual criminal
prosecutions resulting from violations of the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
133 10 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4944
(2012) (“Congress may, in certain areas, in the so-called public welfare crimes . . . impose criminal
liability on a corporation for merely doing the prescribed act, wholly unrelated to knowledge, actual or
constructive.”).
134 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 1349
(2012).
135 2 JOHN VILLA, CORPORATE COUNSEL GUIDELINES § 5:6 (2011).
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actually extended it to settings where the “statute defining the offense contains a knowledge
or intent requirement.”136 Consequently, and notwithstanding the fact that this doctrine has
“rarely” been employed as a basis for prosecution, prudential and precedential grounds exist
for broadening its application to the securities domain.137 Even so, supervisory culpability
under the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine remains predicated on the independent
establishment of the underlying corporate agent’s securities law violation.138 For this reason,
and given the impediments that inhere to current securities laws, resort to the doctrine
would complement—as opposed to substituting—outright statutory modification.139
Statutory criminalization of corporate negligence already “span[s] a range of
behaviors.”140 Rather than “dispensing with the requirement of proving mens rea,” as a strict
liability regime would entail, “reasonable inferences” can effectively serve as bases for doling
out individual fault pursuant to a corporate criminal negligence standard.141 Indeed, in those
U.S. corporate contexts where a criminal negligence standard has already been adopted,
modification was spurred by the realization that the offenses in question were “more costly,
both in terms of human lives and economically,” than had previously been believed.142
Data drawn from nearly 200 corporate offenders sentenced in federal court during
the mid-1980s, which showed that the average monetary harm per offense was $565,000,
while the average loss attributed to each burglary during this same period was $1,000, helped
crystallize the view that—at least within certain industries—corporate crime was “perhaps
the most dangerous . . . kind of crime that occurs in our society.”143
Guided by the effect that the “special significance”144 of public health and
environmental considerations has had in motivating the reduction of scienter requirements
in certain corporate domains, cursory consideration of the disastrous—yet frequently
overlooked—harms proximately caused by the 2008 Financial Crisis dramatically narrows
any perceived disparity between the detriment which flows from an unsupervised torrent of
toxic red sludge and that which results from a fraudulently marketed synthetic collateralized
debt obligation.145
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The global financial crisis has indirectly exposed more than 40% of U.S. households
to unemployment, negative home equity, arrears on their mortgage payments, or foreclosure,
and has also left many expectant retirees grappling with “substantial losses” that forestalled
retirement plans and swaths of younger workers unable to “reach their expected level of
lifetime earnings.”146 Accordingly, the “previously barely conceivable extent of damage . . .
that could be wrought” by securities fraud is now on full display, making the notion that
corporate criminal negligence somehow represents a qualitatively inappropriate legal
benchmark in all but a handful of industries simply untenable.147 Even those ordinarily
opposed to greater governmental oversight of U.S. corporate activity, and who insist that
criminal law ought to be “reserved for conduct that society finds so repugnant as to warrant
the severest sanction,” will be hard-pressed to deny that the corporate misconduct which
produced the societal suffering endured since the 2008 Financial Crisis’ onset qualifies as
sufficiently repugnant.148
In short, appreciating the manifest resemblance that systemic securities fraud’s
harms bear to the more visceral damage other types of corporate crime leave behind only
strengthens the case for pursuing reform through the modification of statutory proof-ofintent requirements. Absent such reconceptualization—through which the financial
industry’s destructive potential is most accurately reflected—further conventional
legislation,149 aimed at what is already the “most heavily regulated and monitored area of
corporate activity,”150 likely will do little more than deepen and repeat the false sense of
security which has cyclically followed each post-crisis regulatory intervention.
X.

OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTING THE POLICIES PRESCRIBED AND THE
CONSEQUENCES OF INACTION

Robustly enhancing corporate criminal statutes is more easily prescribed than
implemented. The effort must, despite its appeal, overcome an array of uniquely structural
obstacles; namely, the reality that corporate political contributions—now more easily
dispensed than ever before151—“influence outcomes in ways that no private citizen can,”
and the fact that “[m]any convicted corporations are the most generous [political]

consequences of the recession . . . will be far-reaching and severe,” with “notably increase[d] risks of
strokes, heart attacks, and catastrophic illness” already being registered).
146 Michael D. Hurd & Susann Rohwedder, Effects of the Financial Crisis and Great Recession on American
Households 21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16407, 2010), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16407.
147 Gobert & Punch, supra note 51, at 7.
148 Weissmann, Ziegler, McLoughlin, & McFadden, supra note 4, at 6.
149 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745; see also Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
150 Laufer, supra note 20, at 109.
151 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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donors.”152 Even though curtailment of entity-level enforcement would accompany the
proposed criminalization of corporate negligence and presumably increase a corporation’s
discretionary funds, the fact that corporate contribution decisions will still be made by
individual agents who will increasingly find themselves in prosecutorial cross-hairs suggests
that any stringent corporate criminal reform proposal is likely to further embolden the
financial services industry’s already well-financed opposition.153
Aside from such predictable resistance, mobilizing Congress to revisit and make
discrete modifications to recently enacted legislation is often as necessary as it is difficult.
Essentially, because Dodd-Frank, much like Sarbanes-Oxley, can be described as an
emergency law154 enacted during a period of immense political and financial turmoil, it raises
doubt as to whether the “healthy ventilation of issues” needed in order to guarantee this
regulatory initiative’s effectiveness indeed took place prior to its passage.155
While the obstacles to the enactment of more stringent corporate criminal laws
remain considerable, the risks associated with continued inaction—both socially and
legally—are even more profound. Much like its predecessors, Dodd-Frank’s failure to adopt
proof-of-intent requirements, which would better enable regulators to investigate and
prosecute corporate crimes at the individual level, illustrates the latest in a long line of
instances where the federal government has deliberately refrained from employing the most
powerful deterrent in its legal arsenal—meaningful scienter reform—to combat what are, by
now, undeniable patterns of fraud that, as a result of the U.S. financial sector’s
unprecedented dominance and interdependence, continue to plunge the United States into
deeper periods of crisis.156
Additionally, if more vigorous corporate criminal law reform than Dodd-Frank fails
to yield either a perceived or actual reduction in fraud, then U.S. corporations and their
agents may find themselves regulated by as many as 50 different jurisdictions, each of which
will more aggressively seek to punish and deter corporate misconduct as “state attorneys
Laufer, supra note 20, at 55-56.
Lobbying
Database,
CTR.
FOR
RESPONSIVE
POLITICS
(Aug.
14,
2012),
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php (noting that during the year leading up to the DoddFrank Act’s enactment (i.e., 2009), total lobbying expenditures exceeded the cumulative amounts
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154 See Ivy Xiying Zhang, Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON.
74 (2007) (calculating the five-year costs of complying with the hastily enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act to
have exceeded $1.4 trillion and suggesting that, in addition to being more economical, more targeted
reforms might have also been more effective).
155 Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J.
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general on the warpath . . . pursuing the crimes Washington [will] not.”157 Not only will the
proliferation of numerous and potentially divergent state corporate criminal law regimes
prove immensely disruptive to the uniformity that corporations depend on to structure their
internal affairs, but widespread legal reform at the state level may bring with it the chilling
over-deterrence that tends to accompany the passage of legislation less interested in
preventing future harm than in placating a public appetite for retribution and settling
political scores.158
XI.

CONCLUSION

A thorough understanding of the prevailing mechanisms through which U.S.
corporate criminal laws are enforced underscores many of the reasons for their repeated
failure to prevent fraud-induced economic crises. Far from embodying a panacea for all that
ails the substance and enforcement of existing securities laws, meaningful scienter reform
which incorporates—and consistently incarcerates upon violations of—a criminal negligence
standard is a long overdue and much needed advance.
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